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Universal banking  is widely held to enjoy comparative advantages in corporate finance. Recent 
theories of financial intermediation argue that ‘insider systems’ are better suited to effectively deal 
with long-term growth and moral hazard problems. However, little attention (if any) is usually paid 
to corporate governance problems that are specific to universal banking.  
 
How can banks’ ownership structure and agency problems influence their ability to address long-
term growth and moral hazard problems? Under which institutional arrangements, incentives and 
constraints can universal banking effectively realize its potential?  
 
The paper looks at such issues through the experience of interwar Italy. The evolution of universal 
banking in the 1920s emerges as heavily exposed to potentially serious problems of moral hazard 
and conflicts of interest, due to inefficient corporate governance, lack of external controls and a 
moral-hazard-enhancing institutional set-up. These factors may distort bank managers’ incentives, 
affect strategic trade-offs and lead to unsound banking.  
 
The findings are consistent with that part of corporate governance literature which points to the 
potential for moral hazard and conflicts of interest inherent to universal banking and emphasise the 
conditional and historically-specific nature of its alleged benefits. 
 
 
JEL classification: G21; G34. 
Key words: Universal banking; Corporate governance; Italy.
                                                 
1 I am grateful to the participants in the session on ‘Financial Markets and Corporate Governance’ at the 
Business History Conference 48th Annual Meeting (Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, Delaware,  19-
21 April 2002),  and in particular to Richard Sylla,  for their useful comments.  






Universal banking  is widely held to enjoy comparative advantages in corporate finance, 
relative to alternative institutional arrangements such as specialised banking. Recent 
theories of financial intermediation argue that financial systems in which universal banks 
provide most of outside corporate finance, are better suited to effectively deal with long-
term growth and moral hazard problems. This view translates into the corporate governance 
literature in the form of the alleged superiority of the ‘insider-system’, typical of Germany 
(in the form of ‘relationship banking’) and Japan (based on a ‘main bank’ system), as 
opposed to the Anglo-Saxon ‘outsider system’ (Aoki and Patrick 1994; Franks and Meyer 
1997; Prevezer and Ricketts 1999). Literature largely focuses on the role of universal banks 
as ‘insiders’ with substantial power to influence firms’ strategic decisions. Due to 
commitment to long-term relationship (which expands the investment horizon of firms) and 
consistent monitoring of financed firms (which allows banks to collect information while 
providing firms with incentives to improve performance), bank-oriented institutional 
environments are believed more effectively to promote an efficient allocation of resources. 
In a information-based approach to corporate governance (i.e., a pecking-order framework), 
universal banks can optimise long-term, information-conducive contractual arrangements 
throughout the firm’s life cycle. In this view, financial contracts that lower the costs of 
information and corporate governance are also supposed to reduce the cost of external 
finance and stimulate investment, thus contributing to economic growth in the long-run 
(Calomiris 2000).  
Dominated as it is by the role of universal banks as insiders in firms’ corporate governance, 
neither theoretical nor empirical literature has explicitly addressed the problem of corporate 
governance of universal banks so far. This is the main goal of this paper. Which are the 
agency problems that are specific to universal banks? How does banks’ ownership structure 
influence their ability to address long-term growth and moral hazard problems? Under 
which institutional arrangements and constraints can universal banking more effectively 
realize its potential? The paper looks at those issues in the mirror of the failure of universal 
banks in interwar Italy. The collapse of the Italian German-style ‘mixed banks’ is 
traditionally explained as the consequence of extremely risky strategies (escalating equity 
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holding, high concentration of debt financing in a small group of firms, excessive reliance 
on central bank liquidity and foreign credit lines) undertaken in the context of the 
macroeconomic deflationary stock brought home by the 1925-26 stabilisation. Their 
destabilising potential proved unsustainable in the downturn cycle of 1930-33, thus 
requiring the state to intervene to bail-out and finally take over the banks (Toniolo 1980;   
Confalonieri 1994). Under many respects, the Italian case has strong similarities with other 
universal banks’ failures in central Europe (see Schubert 1991 on the Austrian Credit-
Anstalt for an example). However, the story also casts light on a banking system plagued 
by institutional inefficiencies, unresolved moral hazard problems, massive conflict of 
interest, widespread managerial misbehaviour and systematic monitoring failure. A 
structural bias towards unsound banking was evident in universal banking Italian-style well 
before the systemic crisis of 1931-32. The paper analysises this issue from a corporate 
governance perspective. Universal banks were characterised by a system of corporate 
governance based on kind of siamese twinship. The expression ‘siamese twins’ was minted 
by Raffaele Mattioli, a bank manager at the head of Banca Commerciale Italiana from the 
1930s to the 1970s, to describe the intricate network of cross-ownership links between the 
mixed banks and their corporate customers which drove them to collapse in 1931-33. The 
basic concept may be translated into modern terms of moral hazard and conflict of interest. 
Section 1 reviews the theoretical literature on moral hazard and conflict of interest in 
universal banking, and raises the question – whose relevance seems underestimated in the 
dominant approach – of how universal banks’ ownership structure may affect agency 
problems and their ability to realize their beneficial potential. Section 2 analyses the 
historical evolution of the Italian main universal banks (Banca commerciale italiana, BCI, 
and Credito italiano, CI) in the interwar period in the light of four critical issues: the market 
for corporate control of banks, internal controls, external controls and the institutional set-
up, and the fundamental characteristics of the market for corporate control in the non-
financial sector. Section 3 proposes an interpretation of the crisis of universal banking in 
Italy as a consequence of structural flaws in corporate governance. A simple model is 
presented  here which elaborates on universal banking as a form of relational financing and 




1. Theoretical Issues: Who Monitors the Monitor? A Review 
There exists a widespread consensus that an ‘insider system’ of corporate governance, 
dominated by universal banks engaging in the full range of intermediation services 
(including brokerage and investment banking) and being allowed to hold equity in 
borrowing firms, to vote their shares and to act as directors, may bring a number of 
advantages. The potential conflict of interest between banks as lenders and banks as 
shareholders, due to different pay-off structures to debt and equity, entails a high potential 
cost of active bank involvement in running a firm (Krozner and Strahan 1999). However, 
the use of strip finance (debt-equity finance) is regarded as an effective strategy for a bank 
willing to lessen moral hazard (controlling riskiness of firms’ strategy, monitoring and 
influencing managerial effort, as well as preventing distribuition of assets to shareholders at 
the disadvantage of creditors and innaccuracy in reported return realizations), obtain access 
to insider information (also through interlocking directorates) and commit the firm to long-
term, exclusive business relationship (especially useful in case of restructuring) (Mayer 
1988; Fisher 1990; for a review, Canals 1997). Moreover, also banks’ ability to produce 
credible information about a borrowing firm’s prospects at the benefit of the firm’s non-
equity stakeholders is seen to depend crucially on the structure of the bank’s financial claim 
on the firm. Of course, an equity claim tends to align bank interest with the firm’s owners 
against the firm’s stakeholders, thus potentially undermining bank’s credibility as delegated 
monitor. This however influence the bank’s incentive to monitor and control the riskiness 
of the firm’s investment policy. In this case, an equity claim can turn into an incentive to 
exercise significant control over the firm’s investment choice, thus refusing to finance 
excessively risky projects. Indeed, some argue that exactly the opposite may happen, if the 
bank shares the firm owner’s interest in taking excessively risky projects and shifting risk 
to the firm’s non-equity stakeholders. For this reason Berlin, John and Saunders (1992) 
suggest that the optimal financial claim for an informed bank – i.e. a bank with substantial 
influence over the firm as its dominant source of financing and an informed investor – 
should be initially a mixed contractual claim including both debt and equity, as the 
appropriate instrument to enforce an efficient selection of project risk by the firm. Under 
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conditions of financial distress, a ceiling on equity holdings should be set in order to 
preserve bank’s credibility in the eyes of non-equity stakeholders.  
This optimally structured claim may allow the bank to mitigate conflict of interest between 
the firm and its fixed claimants. Empirical investigations tend to confirm such view. Gorton 
and Schmid (2000), for example, do not find any evidence of German banks extracting 
private value to the detriment of firms, or using proxy voting to the detriment of other 
shareholders; in turn, firms’ performance is positively correlated to concentration of equity 
control rights in the banks’ hands.  Similarly, universal banks are believed to improve 
efficiency of financial markets. Gande et al. (1997) argue that net-certification effect of 
bank underwritings (benefits of having better information outweighing potential conflict of 
interest) should dominate, especially if debt security issue by borrowing firms is not  
related to repayment of existing bank debt. The history of the US financial system seems to 
support this vision. In the pre-Glass-Steagall epoch, for example, securities underwritten by 
commercial banks showed a better default record, which is interpreted as evidence of a net 
certification effect to investors (Ang and Richardson 1994, Kroszner and Rajan 1994, Puri 
1996). 
However, a different perspective can be adopted. Baums (1994) casts doubts on the actual 
ability of universal banks to produce the potential benefits of a German-style insider 
system, either in terms of corporate finance or in terms of corporate governance. He also 
emphasises that taking equity in firms may simply represent a growth strategy based on 
rent-seeking (in the form of exclusivity of normal banking business: an attitude typical of 
house-banks with long-term relationship, large equity-holding in firm, special responsibility 
of the bank in times of financial distress, representation of the bank in the firm’s board of 
director). Walter (1996) stresses that large universal banks may be able to extract economic 
rents from the market by application of market power (an issue that attracted little 
investigation by empirical studies so far), thus leading to oligopoly, if not prevented by 
regulation and international competition. On theoretical grounds, Boyd, Chang and Smith 
(1998) show that, under universal banking, taking equity positions and assuming control 
rights may attenuate banks’ incentives to control moral hazard problems, as they can share 
more easily the benefits of ‘misallocating’ funds (for example, by incentivating transactions 
between firms in which they hold control rights). Moreover, moral hazard problems may 
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assume particular gravity under specific economic conditions – namely, low real return on 
savings, high returns on misallocated funds, scarcity of funds and large equity holding 
(which allow banks to extract additional surplus from borrowers). Moral hazard problems 
tend to be exacerbated under conditions of State deposit insurance: more specifically, 
equity holdings align the incentives of banks and borrowers, potentially at the expenses of 
the insurer.  
Finally, potential for conflict of interest in universal banking is endemic. Walter (1996) 
provides a long list of possible conflict-of-interest situations: (a) stuffing fiduciary 
accounts. A bank acting as an underwriter and unable to place securities in a public offering 
(therefore exposed to potential underwriting loss) may seek to ameliorate this loss by 
‘stuffing’ unwanted securities into accounts managed by its investment department. (b) 
bankruptcy-risk transfer. A bank with loans to a firm whose bankruptcy risk has increased 
(to the private knowledge of the banker), may induce the firm to issue bond or equities 
(underwritten by its securities unit) to an unsuspecting public; proceeds are then used to 
pay-down the bank loan. In this case the bank transfers debt-related risk to outside 
investors. (c) third-party loans. To ensure successful underwriting, a bank may make 
favourable loans to third-party investors on condition that funds are used to purchase 
securities underwritten by the bank itself. (d) tie-ins. A bank may force a firm to buy its 
securities products under threat of credit-rationing.   
The problem is therefore that universal banks may well be able to get better information, 
but also have incentives to exploit information asymmetries to misrepresent this 
information to the market or to extract extra surplus from client firms (Gande et al., 1997). 
As a consequence, a need arises for specific mechanisms to control conflict of interests 
(i.e., disincentives to exploit such conflicts). These may be: (a) market-based (market-
reputation and competitio as disciplinary mechanisms); (b) regulation-based (‘firewalls’ 
between types of activities); (c) internal (loyalty, professional conduct, respect to the 
institution’s long-term survival). On balance, the view that moral-hazard-reducing behavior 
should be considered as intrinsic to the nature of universal banking appears unjustified. 
Universal banking is equally exposed to potential benefits and risks. Country- and 
historically-specific factors – such as institutional set-up, legal environment, level of 
economic development, patterns of corporate governance – are what determine the final 
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outcome. As Aoki correctly argues, ‘there is probably no financial system that is the most 
efficient throughout all stages of development and across different economies with diverse 
characteristics. Recognizing this will make the comparative institutional analysis of 
financial systems one of the most important research agenda items for understanding the 
workings of advanced, developing, and transforming economy’ (Aoki 1994, 140). 
A major weakness of the existing literature is insufficient attention to universal banks as 
financial intermediaries with specific agency problems and related systems of incentives 
and controls. Does the ownership structure of a universal bank matter? How is this 
translated into the bank’s corporate governace? Can agency problems, moral hazard and 
potential conflict of interests affect the bank’s ability to efficiently perform its multiple role 
of financier and monitor? 
We assume that, in universal banking as elesewhere, shareholders’ utility function is biased 
towards maximisation of the bank’s value (risk-neutrality, diversification, efficiency, 
adaptation to changing market and economic structure through innovation, high 
profitability). On the contrary, managers have incentives to opportunistic behavior 
(maintainance and expansion of power), which may lead to risk concentration, sluggish 
management, maintanance of cost and organisational inefficiencies (e.g., expansion of 
lending volume in order to cover operation costs, thus taking in further risk), or 
preservation of privileges in asymmetric informations (to influence strategic decisions). 
Within such framework, different ownership structures produce different agency problems. 
Dispersed ownership (such as in the case of public companies) entails high monitoring 
costs for individual shareholders and large discretion of management, since only large 
stockholders have strong enough incentives to monitor firm’s management (Schleifer and 
Vishny, 1986). This situation can be mitigated to some extent by the presence of 
institutionalised shareholders coalitions or strong institutional investors, while the market 
for corporate control can provide managers with incentives in line with shareholders 
interest. On the other side, an ownership structure based on a coalition of strong 
stockholders may be in better position to exercise effective strategic leadership, limit 
managers’ opportunistic behaviour and provide stronger incentive to managerial efficiency. 
However, there exists also the risk of opportunistic behaviour of controlling stockholders. 
This may lead to conflict of interests, especially in the presence of a relationship banking 
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connection. In this case the utility function of controlling stockholders may incorporate a 
bias towards maximising the volume of credit and services obtained from the bank at the 
minimum cost, rather than maximising banks’ value. The existence of interlocking 
directorates may even lead to magnifying conflicts of interest. Controllers and/or managers 
may use corporate banking and underwriting activities to benefit themselves at the expense 
of the solvency of the bank (i.e., to ‘loot’ the bank), for example through underpricing of 
services (Shull and White 1998, 17). 
Moreover, asymmetric information in favor of managers cannot be completely eliminated, 
due to limited access of directors to independent sources of information and subject to their 
ability to effectively manage information flows. Due to possible inefficiencies in the 
working of both market and internal controls, it is all important that bank managers are 
subject to external institutional controls, in the form of regulation, monitoring and 
supervision by monetary authorities. On balance, external (either market or institutional) 
and internal controls are fundamental in order to prevent the emergence of bank crisis 
caused by inadequate conduct by managers as to (1) risk forecasting/control, (2) efficient 
organisational structure, (3) profitability (Baravelli 1998). How does corporate governance 
affect bank managers’ performance under these three aspects? 
 
2. Siames Twinship: Moral Hazard and Conflicts of Interest in Italian Universal 
Banks  
Recent literature on universal banking, dealing almost exclusively with the post-1945 
period, found little empirical evidence of moral hazard and conflict of interest. The case of 
Italian mixed banks in the 1920s and 1930s, in turns, provides plenty of it. The paper 
focuses exclusively on the two major universal banks of the period, Banca commerciale 
italiana (BCI) and Credito italiano (CI). BCI and CI, both founded in the 1890s, were 
organized in the form of fully-integrated universal banks, providing a broad range of 
financial services  (short-term and long-term credit; issue, underwriting and placement of 
securities) under a single corporate structure supported by a single capital base. This 
corresponds to a Type-A universal bank, following Walter’s taxonomy of organisational 
patterns (Walter 1996, 2). Both banks experienced rapid growth. In 1910, BCI and CI’s 
fund raising (fiduciary deposits and current accounts) accounted for 48.5% of total fund 
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raising of joint-stock banks (società ordinarie di credito) and 14.3% of total fund raising of 
the banking system as a whole. In 1936, their quotas had reached 54.3% and 21.8% of 
fund-raising of joint-stock banks and total banks, respectively. (Data from Banca d’Italia, 
Ufficio Ricerche Storiche, 1996).  
BCI and CI, both based in Milan and with considerable branch networks (91 branches for 
BCI, 70 branches for CI in the late 1920s), provided by far the lion’s share of long-term 
lending and corporate finance services to a rapidly expanding industrial sector. 
Contemporary observers publicly denounced ‘the competition to capture firms’, the 
imposing dimension reached by the four major mixed banks – beside BCI and CI, the 
Banca Italiana di Sconto, an aggressive universal bank founded in 1914 and operating as 
main bank of the mechanical group Ansaldo, and the Banco di Roma, a second-rank 
institution based in Rome – and the absolute dominance of such ‘bank quadrumvirate’ in 
the allocation of credit (Bachi 1919).  Concentration in corporate banking further increased 
in the early 1920s as a consequence of the collapse of the BIS and the crisis of the Banco di 
Roma, which had to be bailed out by the Banca d’Italia, the central bank. BCI and CI 
assumed an indirect control participation in the Banco di Roma, although resisted the 
Banca d’Italia’s requests to get directly involved in the management of the bank. In 
addition, CI took direct control of – and finally (1930) merged with – the Banca Nazionale 
di Credito (BNC), a bank created in 1924 to manage part of the large equity holdings of the 
liquidated BIS. The leading role of BCI and CI in corporate banking was further 
strengthened after they jointly took over the Società per le Strade Ferrate Meridionali (also 
called ‘Bastogi’), a former railway company turned (after the railway nationalisation of 
1905 and thanks to the large liquidity provided by state indemnities) into a financial 
intermediary with a broad range of activities in corporate banking and a large portfolio of 
equity holdings in public utilities. Post-war universal banking was therefore characterised 
by keen duopolistic competition among BCI and CI. (A detailed, massive account of the 
period 1914-1933, based on a twenty-year archive investigation, is in Confalonieri 1994. 
For a concise outline of facts and interpretations, see Toniolo 1995).  
How large was the potential for moral hazard and conflicts of interest in Italian universal-
banks after FWW? This section provides a tentative answer to such question by focusing on 
four corporate governance key-issues, whose critical relevance emerges from the literature 
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reviewed above: (1) the market for corporate control in the financial sector; (2) internal 
controls on agency problems; (3) the institutional set-up of universal banking (regulation 
and external controls); (4) the role of universal banks in the market for corporate control in 
the non-financial sector.  
1. Ownership structure and the market for corporate control in the financial sector. 
The interwar expansion of BCI and CI took place in a situation of sedated market discipline 
in the top banking sector. During the war, large industrial groups, such Ansaldo and Fiat, 
used large liquidity provided by wartime profits to launch unsuccessful hostile take-overs 
on BCI and CI. In the course of a four-years tug-of-war and in order to prevent further take-
over threats, the ownership structure of both banks was ‘armoured’ by concentrating their 
control in two bank-holdings (Comofin and Cofina respectively), whose capital was owned 
partly by the banks themselves, partly by a group of ‘allied’ bankers and industrial 
companies. At least in the case of BCI there exists evidence that the bank extended third-
party loans to its ‘allies’ in order to facilitate purchases of Comofin shares. Moreover, since 
1926 BCI financed Comofin’s purchases of BCI shares, in the attempt to stabilise the 
market value of its shares: this finally led Comofin to hold 93% of BCI shares 
(Confalonieri 1994, 52-69). This strategy of financial engineering had two main 
consequences: (1) it effectively insulated BCI and CI from the potential disciplinatory 
device provided by the market for corporate control; (2) by giving ‘allied groups’ (i.e., 
industrial corporations financed and sometimes participated by the banks) a role of 
controlling stockholders, it magnified the potential for the emergence of conflicts of interest 
and moral hazard behavior. From 1920 onwards, new equity issues and stocks of old 
equities of BCI and CI were largely purchased by Comofin and Cofina, usually with funds 
provided by the banks themselves (through credit lines or purchases of holdings’ equities). 
At the end of the 1920s this meant that the banks largely owned their own capital (a 
strategy largely practiced by Austrian and German banks). The capital/asset ratio of the two 
banks was virtually zero (Confalonieri 1994, 549-551). 
2. Internal controls.  
Changes in the ownership structure of BCI and CI had a strong impact also on agency 
costs. Before FWW, the ownership structure of both banks included many of the founding  
foreign banks and Italian investors. Over time, the weight of foreign stockholders gradually 
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declined but large presence of foreign (mainly German, Swiss, French) directors and 
managers  kept guaranteing a regular and effective control of managers by shareholders, 
together with a relative insulation from domestic economic and political pressures (Hertner 
1991; Confalonieri 1994, 112-119). For this period, Fohlin (1998a) found little empirical 
evidence that affiliation to BCI sensibly improved firms’ liquidity sensitivity of 
investments. This suggest that the bank was not pushing the growth rate of affiliated firms 
far beyond the rate permitted by the firm’s cash flow. (Replicating the test for the period 
1919-1932 should allow us to detect whether banks’ behavior changed after the war: this 
will form the subject of a future paper). 
The concentration of the control of BCI and CI in the two bank-holdings, as mentioned 
above, radically increased potential for conflict of interest. In fact, the two bank-holdings 
were controlled by industrial companies that were financed by the two banks and in which 
the banks held equity positions. The controlling group of BCI was formed by a coalition of 
private bankers and industrial firms (group Marsaglia), among which many were financed 
and participated by BCI itself. Similarly, the controlling group of CI was formed by a group 
of small private banks, large public utilities groups (Edison, La Centrale) and large 
industrial corporations (Fiat, Pirelli, Snia). Controlling stockholders were massively 
represented by top managers and directors in the banks’ boards. As a consequence of cross-
shareholdings and interlocking directorates, in both cases firms enjoyed a significant 
influence on the banks’ strategic decisions and, as controlling stokholders, were in charge 
of monitoring bank managers. Potential for conflicts of interest intensified, and pressure 
stemming from double loyalty was bound to escalate, especially in cases of firms hit by 
negative shock and financial distress (Kroszner and Strahan 2001). The absence of effective 
internal controls contributed to make things worse. The Auditing Board (‘collegio 
sindacale’), the body in charge of internal controls,  enforced legal rather than functional 
control as a matter of tradition; moreover, its members were selected by the board of 
directors. A further breach of the traditional corporate governance pattern was the abolition 
of statutory constraints on equity holdings. In the case of BCI, the original statute set a 
ceiling to equity holdings (government and other public bonds and participations in other 
banks excluded) of 30 per cent of paid-up capital plus reserves. Between 1920 and 1923 the 
management proposed – and the controlling stockholders accepted – the complete 
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liberalisation of equity holdings, thus obtaining virtually uncostrained discretion 
(Confalonieri 1994, 464-466).  
3. External Controls and Institutional Set-Up 
External controls and regulatory constraints were virtually absent until 1926. Joint-stock 
banks were subject only to the Commercial Code of 1882, which entailed neither specific 
requisites nor obligations as to the establishment of banks or the exercise of banking (with 
few exceptions, such as foreign currency trade). Banks’ statutes were totally free to set the 
range of activities conducted by the bank. There was no external supervision whatsoever, a 
part from the obligation to report monthly balances to the Tribunal and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Industry ad Commerce. There was no rule imposing standard accounting 
layout: balance sheets’ heterogeneity was large and made checking directors’ 
responsibilities a hard task. This reflected more general flaws of the Code, which set very 
loose regulation as to syndication of equity holdings, cross-holdings, stock-pyramiding 
(largely blamed in the contemporary literature as ‘metodo della catena’, or chain of 
corporations – see Einaudi 1921), internal controls and penalties for directors and 
managers’ misbehaviour.  
A structural change in institutional set-up occurred after the banking reform of 1926, which 
established a sector-specific legal framework for banking. Establishment of new banks, 
opening of branches and mergers became subject to official authorisation by the Ispettorato 
per la difesa del risparmio or the Ministry of Finance, after consultation with the Banca 
d’Italia. All banks were imposed new regulations as to maximum credit to individual 
customers, minimum net capital-and-reserves/deposit ratios, formation of reserves. 
Supervision by the Banca d’Italia was also introduced in the form of periodical, 
standardised reports of balances, and direct enquiries. However, the reform’s main purpose 
was to rationalise the periphery of the banking system, affected in the past decade by 
uncontrolled proliferation of banking institutions at local level and by totally unregulated 
competition for depositors. The Bank of Italy officially ruled out the possibility that central 
bank’ supervision could entail either controls on the quality of credit granted by banks, or 
any explicit or implicit insurance of depositors. Moreover, there exists evidence that in fact 
no credible supervision was ever implemented on large universal banks, which continued to 
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enjoy the privileges of a ‘special regime’ based on personal, non-institutionalised, top-level 
relationships with monetary and political authorities (Confalonieri 1994, 431-450). 
Actually the central bank contributed to increase the potential for moral hazard behavior in 
the system. The Banca d’Italia espoused a very liberal attitude as supervisor and lender of 
last resort, both by providing large liquidity to banks under financial distress as well as by 
intervening  to bail them out after full-blown crises broke out (such as in the case of the 
Società Bancaria Italiana in 1907 and the Banca Italiana di Sconto in 1920-21). 
Subsequently, the central bank – through two special-purpose institutions (CSVI, 
Consorzio sovvenzioni valori industriali, and ILI, Istituto Liquidazioni Industriali) – 
maintained substantial equity holdings in industrial groups once controlled by collapsed 
banks, and provided industrial credit to large corporations. Giving in to political pressures, 
the Bank also used to press large mixed banks to intervene with credit facilities in favor of 
distressed firms of ‘national interest’.  In a number of cases, in the early 1920s the CSVI 
assisted large banks by accepting to grant credit facilities against the purchase of part of 
their equity portfolio. (Confalonieri 1994, 431-443) Moreover, the central bank negotiated 
with top managers and controlling shareholders of BCI and CI the active involment of the 
two banks in the settlement of bank crisis. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that the 
systematic provision of liquidity to the system by the central bank – hardly accompanied 
with intensified regulation and supervision – led universal banks to perceive the risk of 
industrial finance as diminishing (Tilly 1998, 17). This may have helped pave the way to 
the rapid escalation of banks’ involvement in corporate finance, either in the form of long-
term lending or equity holding. It is generally accepted that a strong record of access to 
bail-out in periods of liquidity strain tends to secure a public subsidy in the form of a ‘too-
big-to-fail’ guarantee. As known, government-induced moral hazard may contribute not 
only to distort bankers’ incentive (‘head I win, tail you lose’) but also to transmit such 
distortion onto non-financial firms controlled by banks (Walter 1996; Boyd 1999). 
Government-induced moral hazard may in fact induce bankers to rationally seek out 
gambling opportunities by selecting risky investments and financing them in a risky 
manner. Moreover, due to keen competition in corporate banking, there was no cooperation 
between the major banks in sharing information as to cumulation of risky positions. The 
large universal banks also resisted the proposals advanced by the Banca d’Italia, and 
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supported by the Bank Confederation, as to the creation of a central institution with the 
purpose of gathering information as to the total amount of loans granted to individual firms 
by all banks. (Confalonieri 1994, 800-801) 
4. Universal banks and  the market for corporate control in the non-financial sector 
The quarter of century prior to the systemic crisis of 1931 was characterised in Italy by a 
structural change in the financial system. The equity capital stock rose from 10 to 40% of 
GDP, thus catching up with advanced industrialised economies (Conti 1993). Large as well 
as medium-size industrial groups emerged with ownership structures based on holding 
companies whose purpose was to insulate the firm from the market for corporate control. 
Group organisations were dominated by controlling minority structures, i.e. intra-group 
cross-ownership and stock-pyramiding. Holding companies, occasionally incorporated as 
limited partnerhips (to maintain control entirely in the hands of founding families, such as 
the Agnelli, Pirelli and their minor peers), were sitting at the top of corporate groups whose 
extension tended to increase as a function of strategies of diversification and external 
growth (through mergers and acquisitions) pursued by the commanding firm. Some of these 
groups (such as the electric giant Edison) turned into large conglomerates, with activities 
spanning from public utilities to different industrial sectors, from real estate to insurance. 
Intra-group as well as inter-group cross-ownership and stock-pyramiding emerged as the 
basic characteristics of the Italian market for corporate control (Bianco and Casavola, 1995; 
Battilossi 2000). BCI and CI plaid a critical role in the organisation of such coalition-based 
system, as co-founders of new firms, stockholders, and members and managers of 
syndicates of controlling stockholders. The explicit purposes of this agreements were to 
guarantee the firms from any risk of take-over and to preserve the stability of the 
controlling group (‘sindacati di blocco’); usually stockholders’ coalitions also committed 
themselves to jointly intervene in the stock market in order to stabilise the price of the 
syndicated equities (‘sindacati di acquisto-vendita e di difesa dei corsi’) (Confalonieri 
1994). Moreover, universal banks largely dominated in the stock exchange market. The 
reform of 1913 had imposed binding constraints of independent brokers; thus universal 
banks not only emerged as the only market makers, but also enjoyed a dominant position 
within the body in charge with the supervision of the market (Deputazione di Borsa) (Baia 
Curioni 1995, 300-330). The Bank of Italy explicitly supported universal banks’ 
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dominance. In 1926, in the wake of the downward slump of the stock market that followed 
‘Quota 90’ stabilisation, the central bank deployed moral suasion to force BCI and CI into a 
special-purpose joint investment trust (Softit) with the task of pegging the price of equities 
of public utilities and industrial groups controlled by the banks (Confalonieri 1994, 603-
604). 
The consequences of such historical pattern were far-reaching. Due to proliferation of 
cross-ownerhips and stock-pyramids, industrial growth was characterised by a structural 
scarcity of actual risk capital. Moreover, in many cases paid-up capital could represent only 
a small part (1-to-3/10) of the nominal value of authorised capital. This entailed that bank 
credit provided the fundamental lever of industrial expansion. Large universal banks bore 
most of the burden, only marginally assisted by state-owned specialised institutions, created 
in 1919-1925 (Crediop, Icipu). These raised funds by issuing state-guaranteed bonds and 
provided long-term mortgage to public utilities and large industrial corporations, thus 
relieving part of the mounting pressure on universal banks. In 1926-27 temporary relief 
came also from bonds issued by some major industrial groups in the American financial 
market, which allowed firms to consolidate part of their bank debt. 
The inherent riskiness of debt finance dominance was further exacerbated by two of the 
emerging, moral-hazard-enhancing characteristics of the industrial system. First, there was 
a large presence of ‘empire builders’, i.e. entrepreneurs and managers with a strong 
preference for indiscriminate implementation of investment projects (provided that they 
were not cash constrained). Hart and Moore (1995) suggest that,under incomplete contracts, 
debt repayments may provide a cash constraint which tends to discipline corporate 
managers’ behavior, thus leading to optimal investment policy. However, such debt-based 
disciplinary device may be inhibited. If bank managers do not pursue bank’s value 
maximisation, relationship banking may contribute to relax the binding effect of debt 
finance (under roll-over guarantee) or undermine the potential role of bankruptcy as a 
credible threat, thus increasing the risk of moral hazard by firm managers. If flaws in bank 
corporate governance are such that inhibit the ability or willingness of controlling 
shareholders to constrain bank managers, relational financing may provide a channel for a 
self-reinforcing vicious circle of moral hazard behavior.  
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Second, exposure to moral hazard was further increased by the prevalence of ‘minority 
controlling structures’ (MCS). Bebchuk et al. (1999) suggest that, by separating control 
rights from cash-flow rights, MCS may combine incentive problems typical of dispersed 
ownership and controlled structures, thus radically distorting controllers’ incentives. 
Agency costs may increase at a sharply rising rate as the size of cash flow rights in the 
hands of the controlling stockholders decreases. In fact, controlling stockholders are 
entrenched (i.e., insulated from the market for corporate control) but internalize only a 
small part of the value effects of their investment decisions. Thus, the burden of mitigating 
agency costs is shift onto non-electoral constraints of corporate governance, such as 
reputation or legal protection of minority stockholders. This may be translated into 
increasing inefficiency in the choice of project investments (i.e., controllers may give 
preference to projects with larger private benefits of control than to projects with higher 
total value) as well as in the decisions on scope (as the liquidation of a firm entails a loss of 
private benefits of controls, controllers may tend to expand the firm’s scope – hence a 
possible incentive from CMS to conglomeral evolution). Bebchuk et al. (1999, 25-26) also 
stress the importance of debt financing by skilled monitors as a commitment device for 
CMS controllers: debt discipline may in fact deter the inefficient appropriation of private 
control benefits. In this case, the autonomy of the bank from the borrowing firm represents 
a fundamental condition. Obviously this is not the case when banks themselves have 
ownerhsip structures in which financed firms enjoy minority controlling stockholding, as it 
was the case of Italian universal banks. 
The conclusion is straightforward: the universal bank-based system of corporate 
governance emerged in the 1920s was heavily exposed to potentially high levels of moral 
hazard and conflicts of interest, as a consequence of (1) inhibition of disciplining constraint 
through the market for corporate control in the financial sector; (2) large potential for 
conflicts of interest due to the ownership structure of universal banks based on controlling 
minorities formed by financed and participated firms (siamese-twinship); (3) loose 
disciplinary constraint through internal controls on bank managers; (4) virtual absence of 
external controls by the central bank; (5)  moral hazard-enhancing attitude by the central 
bank; (6) a business environment characterised by bank-dependent firms and exposure to 
high risks of dominance of private benefits of control and inefficient investment selection. 
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3.Universal Banking as Relational Finance: A Rent-Seeking Hypothesis 
The proximate cause of the crisis of BCI and CI between 1928 and 1932 was the financial 
distress brought home by concentration of mounting credit exposure towards a small group 
of large borrowers, and  the unsustainable burden of increasing equity holdings, whose 
value was rapidly collapsing as a consequence of (1) the downward spiral of the stock 
exchange under post-1926 deflation,  and (2) the emergence of widespread corporate crises. 
The experience of the two banks, however, was pretty different. Archival evidence shows 
that BCI was much more prone to cumulate equity holdings than CI. In 1929 the ratio of 
total non-financial equity holdings (including equities ‘parked’ in confidential accounts and 
captive financial companies) to total assets of the two banks was at 16 per cent for BCI but 
only 6.7 per cent for CI.  
 
Figure 1 





















(1) Total Equities(‘partecipazioni e titoli’)  in portfolio of parent banks (including confidential accounts) and 
captive financial companies. Bank equities are excluded. CI portfolio includes industrial bonds. CI equity 
holdings in 1930-33: participations in banks only. 
(2) Total assets as in official balance sheet. 
(3) Total assets as in internal balance sheet. 








The degree of concentration of risk was also different, i.e. much higher at BCI than at CI. 
Different characteristics of controlling coalitions may have plaid a role in determining this 
result. The majority of groups with a controlling position in CI (Edison, La Centrale, Fiat) 
had rapidly developed autonomous and advanced financial management functions (capital 
and debt management, access to capital market, rationalisation of intra-group control and 
financial connections, group banking). This reflected a characteristic evolution of electric 
companies in Europe as well as in the USA (Storaci and Tattara 1998). As a consequence, 
this groups enjoyed a notable degree of autonomy and financial independence from the 
bank: potential for conflict of interest was lower and incentives to control moral hazard by 
managers stronger.  Quite opposite was the case for BCI. Here many of the ‘allies’ with 
controlling rights or interlocking directorate connections, such as Terni, Sip, Montecatini, 
maintained a strong financial dependence on the bank, with large leverage and reduced 
autonomous financial functions. (An exception was Sade, an electric group owned by the 
Volpi family and equipped with advanced financial management and strong international 
connections). In this case, the potential for moral hazard problems, opportunistic behavior 
and conflicts of interest was much higher. The BCI management enjoyed large strategic 
autonomy and could embark on extremely risky ventures. The late acquisition of control 
rights in Ilva, a giant steel-maker (1928-29), and Italgas, a troubled gas public utility with 
chemical interests (1931), both in dire financial straits and with serious restructuring 
problems, delivered the final blow to the bank and was a clear manifestation of 
unconstrained moral hazard behavior by BCI managers (Confalonieri 1997, 111-164 and 
562-596). 
However, both in BCI and CI systematic shirking allowed bank managers to disguise in 
part the escalation of equity holdings through a number of technical artifices: stuffing 
fiduciary or reserved accounts, or dividing equity portfolio in small parcels parked in a 
number of captive financial companies (explicitly referred to as ‘financial boxes’). No 
attempts were made to re-organize equity holdings along functional lines – for example, by 
transforming financial boxes into sectoral or specialised holdings with more sophisticated 
functions as to financial management, control and auditing of participated firms. 
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Discussions about organizational reform, considering the opportunity of a more articulated 
structure, with the shifting of corporate banking and financial management activities to 
specialized subsidiaries, functioning as holdings or investment trusts, and the consequent 
transition from fully- to partially-integrated universal bank, only emerged after 1928-29 
(Battilossi 2000, 338-345). 
More generally, there exists clear evidence of banks’ failure in developing adequate 
monitoring power. Corporate monitoring and control require special expertise, concentrated 
resources, and a broad scope as to cross-sectional coverage and time horizon (Aoki 1994, 
109). Pre-war monitoring of client firms was based on a large network of trustees 
(‘fiduciari’) (Fohlin 1998). The escalation of commitment, the increased sophistication of 
corporate structures and management, the prevalence of group organisations, requested 
banks to develop new organisational and technical capabilities. However a credible 
response became apparent only under the mounting pressure of liquidity strain in 1928-29. 
Then BCI established technical and financial/accounting  units specifically devoted to 
monitoring and supervising  industrial customers (‘Ufficio tecnico finanziario’, 
subsequently ‘Segreteria industriale’). Even more timid was the attempt made by CI, which 
in 1928 established a small trustee company with the purpose of analysing the situation of 
financed firms. Indeed, contemporary informed insiders expressed severe opinions on the 
sluggish attitude of the two banks as to modernisation of techniques of business analysis 
and control, organisational capabilities in monitoring, and technical coordination with 
financed firms. Documents by IRI, the state-owned holding company which came to 
control the banks in 1933-34, denounced the banks’ ‘agnosticism’ as a major factor 
contributing to the collapse of many firms (Battilossi 2000, 319-333).  
How was it that banks accepted to massively refinance firms in distress while moreover 
escalating equity holdings from 1926 onwards? Did unconstrained moral hazard and 
conflict of interest contribute to the escalation of unsound banking practices? There are 
three possible, not mutually excluding explanations for this strategy: (1) information; (2) 
insurance; (3) market power. We briefly examine them in sequence.  
(1) We can assume that in a non-transparent system with creative accounting, relaxed 
disclosing rules and low corporate accountability, a bank could access vital information as 
to borrowing firms only by turning from outsider into insider, i.e. by changing the nature of 
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its participation in the global governance of  financed firms from stakeholders (as creditors) 
to stockholders. As to concentration, this might be explained as a strategy to optimise the 
use of scarce monitoring resources and bank-specific knowledge as to sectors and groups. 
However, the ability to extract and process information depends critically on the ability to 
develop adequate organisational capabilities. Universal banks (BCI in particular) and some 
of their ‘allied’ groups were endowed with the necessary human capital and technical 
knowledge: an indirect demonstration is that in fact, in 1932-33, the backbone of IRI 
management – unanimously recognised as of top-standing quality – was formed by 
managers coming from the technical units of the banks. Nonetheless, universal banks 
proved unable to timely exploit their human capital endowment. If escalation of equity 
holding was fundamentally information-driven, why the organisational adjustment of 
monitoring capabilities was so sluggish? Which was the inhibiting factor? 
(2) Insurance. Equity holding was actively searched for by banks as a form of insurance 
against declining value of their claims on firms. In the context of the economic and stock 
market boom of 1922-25, inflationary expectations provided banks with an incentive to pad 
their portfolio with equity holdings, while reducing the urgency of liquidating  equity 
holdings inherited  from postwar settlement (Toniolo 1994, 58-59). However, if equity 
holding was eminently a post-war conjunctural strategy, we would expect banks rationally 
to anticipate the effects of stabilisation and return to Gold, thus liquidating a significant part 
of their equity portfolio in the market at historically-high prices. On the contrary, the 
evidence is that this was not the case: banks’ equity portfolios continued to expand. How 
can we explain this apparently irrational behavior? 
(3) Market power. Universal banking is one possible form of relational financing. As Aoki 
and Dinç (2000) emphasise, relational financing is usually associated to rent-seeking 
strategies by banks: the financier is expected to make additional financing in uncontractible 
states contingent on expectations of future rents over time. When relational financing 
becomes institutionalised – i.e., established  as a self-enforceable, dominant form of 
financing in corporate finance – this tend to generate and sustain expectations of financiers 
and corporate borrowers. Banks  are willing to keep their commitment (Mayer 1988; 
Hellwig 1991) as they expect to obtain rent opportunities in the long term. Adapting the 
framework provided by Aoki and Dinç (2000, 25-28), we can assume that rents may stem 
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from: (a) information advantages (whence strong incentives to invest in integrated – i.e., ex 
ante, interim and ex post – monitoring, which requires substantial equity holdings); the 
effect is stronger when firms have an exclusive relation with the bank which entails the 
provision of different financial services; (b) market power, i.e. the ability to extract surplus 
from borrowers as well as to obtain a surplus of projects to finance (whence strong 
incentives to expand lending to, and taking equity positions in, current borrowers or 
provide lending to, and taking equity positions in, a growing number of firms as less 
favourable terms). (Aoki and Dinc include also reputation as a source of future rents: we 
leave this element aside for the moment). The spiralling vicious circle between bad debts, 
consolidation of credits into equity holdings (in order to guarantee the value of the existing 
clains) and further refinancing (in order to avoid the collapse of the firms) represents a 
classical relational financing trap of ‘throwing good money after bad’: the bank’s exposure 
ends up reaching such a magnitude that the creditor is eventually ‘captured’ by the 
borrower. 
Obviously, the relative weight assigned by bank strategies to different rents (information 
VS market power) depends on the existing balance between controlling stockholders and 
managers’ utility preferences, as it is determined by historically- and institutionally-specific 
factors. This balance may change across economies and over time. Indeed, while we can 
expect that in the long run a bank will invest resources in order to exploit both sources of 
rents, in the short-run there might well be a trade-off between intensifying efforts in 
conquering market power and devoting resources to seek information rents through 
integrated monitoring. We can also assume that, as managers may be more concerned with 
banks’ growth rather than profitability, corporate governance may have important 
consequences. Feeble controls or collusion of stockholders with managers may imply that 
moral hazard tend to lead to a growth-oriented strategy mainly based on market power rent-
seeking. On the contrary, if stockholders’ interests prevail, we may expect a bank to invest 
more in information-intensive rents while accepting to grow at at lower rate. However, if 
controlling stockholders have distorted incentives, e.g. because of conflicts of interest, their 




The intuition behind the suggested trade-off is represented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 
Rent-Seeking Trade-Off: Market Power VS Integrated Monitoring 
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Let’s suppose a universal bank operating under budget constraint. The bank faces a trade-
off between investing resources to seek rents stemming from market power (i.e. a larger 
volume of business from existing customers and a surplus of projects to finance from 
potential customers) and, in turn, investing resources to seek rents stemming from 
information (i.e. better quality of business from current and potential customers thanks to 
efficient integrated monitoring). Bank managers’ utility preferences will tend to privilege 
market power (point A). Bank stockholders’ utility preferences, in turn, will tend to 
privilege monitoring power, as they have a stake in managing and controlling moral hazard 
(point B). However, if stockholders have only loose control on managers’ moral-hazard 
behavior, or their incentives are distorted by conflict of interest, their preferences will lie 
much closer to those of managers  (point B’). Thus the bank’s corporate governance 
structure influences the final allocation of resources between market-power and information 
rent-seeking. This in turn will determine on which sources of rents the pattern of growth of 
the bank will be based more, initially at least. We can also expect that, in the long-run, the 
relative intensity of market-power- and information-rents will tend to balance, as corporate 
governance adjusts to the bank’s performance. This is represented in figure 3. The MP and 
IM schedules represent two different cases of universal bank strategies, one based initially 
on the search for market-power rents (low ratio of investment in monitoring power to 
investment in market power) and the other based on the search for monitoring rents (high 
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Adapting such hypothesis to history, it is possible to explain the pattern of development 
chosen by Italian universal banks – based on the escalation of commitment, refinancing and 
equity holding, irrespective of economic deflation and with only slow and late adjustment 
of monitoring power – as the consequence of a strategy fundamentally based on market-
power rent-seeking, in the context of keen duopolistic competition not only in corporate 
banking but also in the market for corporate control. Not by chance the two banks 
attempted to obtain from customers an exclusive relationship, as a guarantee of being able 
to appropriate future customer-specific rents. After FWW, changes in corporate governance 
structures provided BCI and CI with strong incentives to move along the initial, flat part of 
a MP schedule of unsound banking. The outbreak of crisis and its solution – the 
introduction of institutional firewalls between commercial and investment banking, and the 
reallocation in the hands of the State of property rights on both banks and large part of the 
non-financial corporate sector once controlled by banks – prevented them from any 
possibility of future reform. 
This obviously does not imply that possible contribution by other factors should be ruled 
out. Banking culture may be a point in case: indeed, one of the major experts of banking 
history in Italy described the situation as the consequence, among others, of a 
misperception due to bankers’ ‘true obsession’ for tangible capital assets, rather than 
prospective business and cash-flow, as the base for assessing borrowers’ creditworthiness  
(Confalonieri 1990, 76-86). Moreover, for banks with mounting liquidity constraint – as 
BCI and CI were, due to creeping confidence crisis of depositors in joint-stock banks, the 
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increasing competition by regional and local banks, and the two banks’ reluctance to resort 
to central bank credit (apart from episodes of acute illiquidity) – capturing new firms was 
instrumental to the expansion of the current-account component of fund raising. Other 
possible factors to take into account are potential benefits of expanded banking, such as 
synergies/economies of scope (increased efficiency from combination of activities) and 
diversification/stabilisation (diversification of income streams with reduction of 
unsystematic risk and  bankruptcy/insolvency risk). It is questioned however whether 
diversification actually may decrease or increase insolvency risk – for example, when a 
bank’s entry in corporate and investment banking involve the ownership and operation of a 
few specific activities. In this case, Shull and White (1998, 16-18) suggest that, if the 
bank’s management capabilities are insufficient, the bank’s solvency may be at risk. 
 
4.Conclusion. 
The paper argues that the trade-off between potential benefits and risks of universal 
banking has to be evaluated in the light of institutionally- and historically-specific 
conditions. Theory suggests that potential for moral hazard behavior and conflict of interest 
in universal banks is high. An efficient bank corporate governance is fundamental in order 
to control the adverse consequences of such potential. History may provide evidence in this 
connection. The evolution of the two main universal banks in interwar Italy emerges as a 
case in which both internal and external factors converged in determining a system of bank 
corporate governance prone to unconstrained moral hazard, systematic conflicts of interest 
and inefficient selection of investment projects. As a consequence, in the 1920s Italian 
universal banks moved rapidly towards unsound banking, characterised by continuous 
refinancing of distressed firms, escalation of equity holdings and failure to develop 
effective integrated monitoring. Different characteristics of banks’ controlling coalitions 
possibly contributed to exacerbate or mitigate the effects of this common pattern of 
development. The paper analyses this case by focusing on universal banking as a form of 
relational finance based on rent-seeking strategies. The failure of Italian universal banks 
can be explained as the consequence of a strategy of growth fundamentally driven by a 
search for market power rents, in the context of sustained industrialisation, rapid growth of 
equity capital stock, and keen duopolistic competition by banks both in corporate banking 
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and in the market for corporate control in the non-financial sector. The paper suggests that 
the characteristics of the two banks’ ownership and corporate governance structures lay at 
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